Abstract-In the secure communication areas, three-party authenticated key exchange protocol is an important cryptographic technique. In this protocol, two clients will share a human-memorable password with a trusted server, in which two users can generate a secure session key. On the other hand the protocol should resist all types of password guessing attacks. Recently, STPKE' protocol has been proposed by Kim and Choi. An undetectable online password guessing attack on STPKE' protocol is presented in the current study. An alternative protocol to overcome undetectable online password guessing attacks is proposed. The results show that the proposed protocol can resist undetectable online password guessing attacks. Additionally, it achieves the same security level with reduced random numbers and without XOR operations. The computational efficiency is improved by ≈ 30% for problems of size ≈ 2048 bits. The proposed protocol is achieving better performance efficiency and withstands password guessing attacks. The results show that the proposed protocol is secure, efficient and practical.
INTRODUCTION
In the secure communication areas, three party key exchange protocol is one of the most important cryptographic mechanisms. By this, users can communicate over a public unreliable channel and can agree a secure session key. As the password based authenticated key exchange protocols [1, 2] require users only to remember a human memorable (low-entropy) password, it is rather simple and efficient. From this point of view, PAKE provides convenience and mobility. Password-based authenticated key exchange protocols, however, are vulnerable to password guessing attacks [3] since users usually choose easy-to-remember passwords. Unlike typical private keys, the password has limited entropy, and is constrained by the memory of the user. Thus, the password guessing attacks on password-based authenticated key exchange protocols should be considered realistic. Even though the protocol is simple and efficient, according to Ding and Horster [2] , it should not be vulnerable to any type of off line, undetectable or detectable on line password guessing attacks, since the passwords are of low-entropy.
In general, the password guessing attacks can be divided into three classes [3] :
word in an online transaction. He/ she verifies the correctness of his/her guess using the response from server. A failed guess can be detected and logged by the server. Undetectable online password guessing attacks: Similar to the above, an attacker tries to verify a password guess in an online transaction. However, a failed guess cannot be detected and logged by the server, as the server is not able to distinguish an honest request.
Offline password guessing attacks: An attacker guesses a password and verifies his/her guess offline. No participation from the server is required, so the server does not notice the attack as a malicious one.
The popular three-PAKE protocols are designed for the client-client-server architecture, in which each client shares his password with a trusted server and resorts to the server to authenticate the peer for establishing a session key. In 2004, Lee et al. [5] presented two enhanced threeparty encrypted key exchange (TPEKE) protocols without using public-key techniques, and showed that their protocols can resist several attacks. In 2005, Wen et al. [6] proposed a three-PAKE protocol using Weil pairing and claimed that their protocol is provably secure against active adversaries in the random oracle model [7] [8] [9] [10] . However, Nam et al. [11] showed that Wen et al.'s protocol cannot resist a man-in-the-middle attack.
Recently, Lu and Cao [12] proposed a simple three-party key exchange (STPKE) protocol based on the chosen-basis computational Diffie-Hellman (CCDH) assumption. They claimed that their protocol can resist various attacks and is superior to similar protocols with respect to efficiency. Kim and Choi [13] found that the STPKE protocol is vulnerable to undetectable online password guessing attacks by using formal description and proposed an alternative protocol (STPKE' protocol).
In this paper, it is presented that, STPKE' protocol is vulnerable to an undetectable online password guessing attack, if the identity of the client is exposed, and proposes an alternative protocol by modifying STPKE protocol [12] .
Moreover, the proposed protocol is analyzed on a set of experiments. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes STPKE' protocol, Section 3 presents the undetectable online password guessing attack on STPKE' protocol, Section 4 discusses the proposed protocol, section 5 reports the experimental results, security and efficiency analysis, and the concluding remarks are made in section 6. Step 2a: Upon receiving 
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UNDETECTABLE ONLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK ON STPKE' PROTOCOL
Since identities of clients are not generally secret, there is a chance that they may get exposed. If ID A is exposed then STPKE' protocol falls to undetectable online password guessing attacks. 
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If equal, then the password guessed is correct.
THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
Step 1a: A chooses a random number x ε P Z and computes
, and then sends X ID A || to S.
Step 1b: B chooses a random number as the session key for securing subsequent communications with A. Otherwise, B terminates this protocol run. 
SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

Transmission round and computation complexity
In the PAKE research field, the efficiency of a protocol is measured in terms of number of transmission rounds (steps) and the computation complexity. Table 1 shows the comparison analyses of the proposed protocol and the STPKE' protocol. From the view point of the transmission round, our protocol adopts the parallel message transmission mechanism (i.e A→S and B→S) to achieve a higher security level than the protocol proposed by Kim and Choi (i.e. A→B→S ). Additionally, it maintains higher security level even after deleting the XOR operations when compared with the STPKE' protocol. trapped by third party, then he cannot retrieve any information from the obtained message, since M is a random element shared between client A and the server which cannot be guessed by an attacker. Hence, the third party cannot mount any attack.
Resistance to the password guessing attacks
Third, even if the password PWA is guessed by the attacker, then, in order to get the correct key from the server he should have definite knowledge of 'M', which is impossible.
Perfect forward secrecy:
The enhanced protocol has the perfect forward secrecy. The session key is computed as follows: Man-in the middle attack: Suppose the attacker frames his own message i.e.
with the correctly guessed password and some 'M', sends to the server. The server will find
. Finaly, it computes the hash value with the actual 'M' value and sends back to the client, but since it was calculated with the 'M' value, the key will not be correct, therefore not allowing man-in the middle to mount any attack.
Trivial attack: An attacker may directly try to compute the session key from α or β.
However, due to the intractability of DLP and the one-wayness of hash function, the trivial attack is not possible in the proposed protocol.
Replay attack: Since one way hash function is used, the proposed protocol is in-vulnerable to this attack.
Unknown-key sharing attack: Since M and N are not public, M is shared between client A and the server, N is shared between client B and the server, so there is no chance for an unknown-key sharing attack.
Undetectable online dictionary attack: Since M and N are not public, M is shared between client A and the server, N is shared between client B and the server, so there is no chance for an ousider to mount an undtectable online dictionary attack.
Experimental results
The proposed protocol is implemented on a data set of problems (p), random numbers of size ranging from 128 bits-2048 bits. Apart from the transmission rounds, the running time for computational steps needed in the protocol is analyzed. Table 2 shows the comparison between STPKE' protocol and the proposed protocol with respect to computation time for some selected list of problems.
CONCLUSION
An enhanced password-based key exchange protocol which is in-vulnerable to undetectable online password attacks is proposed. The proposed protocol is achieving better performance efficiency by requiring less numbers of random elements. The performance is improved by ≈ 30% for problems of size 2048 bits. The above theoretical and experimental results show that the proposed protocol is secure, efficient and practical.
